Nhan Dan - It has been 40 years since the Tet Offensive and Uprising broke out in 1968. As far as the time has gone, now is a good opportunity for us consider the special features of this strategic offensive. Following is an analysis by Lieutenant General and Associate Professor Nguyen Dinh Uoc.

First of all, it should be understood that it was a form of mass strategic assaults, driving the large-scale war into 41 cities and towns in the south so as to create devastating effect on the enemy's spirit. This was a strategy which had never been applied in the history of war worldwide and an unique example of the creativity of Vietnam's revolutionary art of war.

The main direction was aimed at the enemy located in urban areas. It proved that people's war in Vietnam was not only strong in rural and mountainous areas but had also developed on a large scale urban basis putting the US forces in a strategically defence position.

Regarding the timing of the attack, it happened on the occasion of New Year (Tet) festival and also during a period when the US was preparing for the presidential elections, a very politically sensitive time. Therefore, the offensive was launched, taking advantage of the enemy's weakness and at the same created a dramatic impact on the US. The US press remarked that the event shook US public opinion.

During the struggle against the US aggressors for national salvation, there was a practice that a large-scale attack was launched every four years as in 1964, 1968 and 1972. The strategic vision of the Party's Politburo was taken on the basis of the war progress in Vietnam, the situation in the US as well as military and political features so as to make creative steps and early strategic preparations.

The offensive was neither early nor late. If it was launched in 1967, two years after the US had launched their "local war" in Vietnam, General Westmoreland - supreme commander of the US forces - would have a pretext to ask for more time to show military strength. If it happened in 1969, the US presidential election had passed, thus failing to create a strong political pressure.

The offensive broke out at the correct strategic moment in terms of military and political advantages when the US was at the peak of its strength. The US would never accept a premature failure. Their strategic defeat in the ever biggest local war would certainly lead to a defeat in the military front, the decisive factor in any battle, thus leading to a failure in the campaign. They were forced to change their strategy together with deploying larger numbers of troops and would need more time to in order to save themselves from a defeat.

The US forces were completely surprised regardless of their large intelligence units and numerous lackeys due to the offensive's three decisive factors including new forms of attack and directions, the good timing and well organised preparations. 

Vietnam seized a great victory in terms of strategy, creating a decisive turning point in the war and succeeding in forcing the US to withdraw their troops.

After the US expeditionary troops massively entered the south of Vietnam, the Party was aware of the fact that a small country would not be able to wipe out such a strong army. The best way was to use a long-term strategy of Vietnamese creative fighting to fight until the US troops quit.

In December of 1967, President Ho Chi Minh together with the Politburo finalised the strategic decision on launching the Tet Offensive and Uprising. In early 1968, he extended his new year greetings to armed forces and people across the country, saying " This spring outshines the previous ones. News of victory rejoices the whole country." In early 1969, Uncle Ho appealed the Vietnamese people to "fight until the American aggressors quit and the puppet administration is toppled."

The development of the war in Vietnam and the political situation in the US proved to be a correct, creative and flexible leading strategy of the Party.

On March 25-26, 1968, US President Johnson invited 16 "wise men" to the White House to consult them on how to run the war in Vietnam after Tet.

Eleven out of 16 strategists, mainly the hawks, pointed to the problem that General Westmoreland was assigned with nearly 500,000 troops, fighting in Vietnam for three years and then it was reported that "a victory was within their reach" so it was possible to carry out a gradual withdrawal. In fact, the US embassy in Saigon was not protected. They noted that it would be very adventurous to send 200,000 more troops, double as compared to their participation in the Korean war, not including the impossibility of early withdrawing from Vietnam. Therefore, it was better to avoid a troop build-up and consider the withdraw of troops from Vietnam.

On March 31, 1968, President Johnson declared a "unilateral end to attacks on North Vietnam from latitude 20. Northwards, he also accepted the opening of the Paris negotiations and announced his decision not to seek re-election.

The 1968 Tet Offensive and Uprising broke out in 41 cities and towns across the south, becoming a new-style Dien Bien Phu and defeating the US attempt to seize a military win in Vietnam. US Secretary of Defence McNamara admitted that no one  in the US administration and army mentioned a military win but peace with honour instead.

The decisive victory of the Tet Offensive and Uprising had led to a change on the battlefield. Then Nixon, widely recognised as a military hawk, withdrew troops from Vietnam, including 60,000 in 1969, 180,000 in 1970 and 130,000 in 1971. Vietnam did not need to continue the attacks on urban areas, avoiding significant losses, but despite that the US failed to turn the situation around. Vietnam faced an advantage concerning a less unbalance ratio of forces following the US withdrawal of 37,000 troops.

Larry Berman, a US historian, wrote in his "No Peace, No Honor" book published in New York in 2001 that the "Vietnamisation" of the war was a simple signal of the US troop withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Saigon puppet administration considered it an abandonment. On February 17, 1971, Nixon declared that the American intervention in Vietnam was coming to an end.

The strategic attacks in 1968 were a display of the fighting strength of the Vietnamese armed forces and people after three years of confrontations with US troops. There were not only artillery ambush or commando units but also many other regular forces, carrying out nonstop attacks in Saigon and Hue. It was estimated that General Westmoreland would need a double of 200,000 additional troops to avoid a military defeat.

To consider the strategic feature of any war, attention should be given to which side the top factor that which side has attained their strategic goals.

It is undeniable that Vietnam had managed to meet their most important goal of defeating the aggressive attempts by the US administration, thus creating a turning point in the war and forcing the US to withdraw their troops.

The Tet Offensive and Uprising has entered history as an unique example of creativity of Vietnam's revolutionary war, reflecting the wonderful will and intelligence of Vietnam in fighting against a stronger enemy.

Under the clear-sighted leadership of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese armed forces and people recorded a glorious victory in the biggest local war launched by the strongest imperialists in the 20th century.

By Lieutenant General and Associate Professor
Nguyen Dinh Uoc