The anti-US struggle for national salvation was carried out under the Party’s clear-sighted and creative revolutionary line. It included two revolutionary strategies, namely the people’s national democratic revolution and socialist revolution which were implemented by combining revolution and the revolutionary war in the south and people’s war in defence of socialism in the north.

In the south, it was not merely a war, but a revolution and revolutionary war launched to overthrow the ruling yoke of the neo-colonialism and to defeat the aggressive war of the US imperialists. It was the brilliant combination and promotion to the peak of the experience drawn from the uprising and concerted uprising on August 1945 with the people’s war to liberate the nation during the struggle against the French colonialists.

With the role of leading the revolution and revolutionary war in the south and under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Politburo led by President Ho Chi Minh, First Party Secretary Le Duan made remarkable contributions to proposing, planning and organising the implementation of the revolutionary line. This was a very difficult task during a complicated situation in the country and in the world from the beginning to the end of the anti-US struggle for national salvation.

The following article deals with mainly the contributions made by Mr Le Duan during the revolution and revolutionary war in the south.

After the victory over the French colonialists, the Party made a self-criticism at its sixth plenum in 1956 that it did not define clearly that the struggle for national reunification had to be a revolutionary war.

During this time, amid the temporarily occupied Saigon under the neo-colonialist rule of the US imperialists, Mr Le Duan started drafting a programme for the South Vietnamese Revolution.

In his memoirs written on the occasion of the 95^th birthday of Mr Le Duan, General Vo Nguyen Giao noted, “After many years of leading the South Vietnamese people’s struggle, Mr Le Duan devoted significant efforts to find a way for the southern revolution. His programme for South Vietnamese revolution made public on August 1956 pointed out that there was only way for the south: To rise up to fight against the US and Diem puppet administration to save the country and to save themselves. That was the revolutionary path and there was no other way. The programme helped cadres, Party members and people there to seek the mode of struggle against the brutal enemy.”

It took a long time for the programme to be put into action after careful discussions and political-ideological arguments and a review of the practical experience collected on the battlefields.

The Party issued a resolution on the revolutionary line in the south in 1959. It was the product of the entire Party’s mind. The resolution met the burning aspiration of the people, especially the South Vietnamese people.

The Party’s revolutionary line in the anti-US struggle for national salvation was a light that lit up the path for the revolution and revolutionary war in the south to achieve one victory after another and then the complete victory regarding the liberation of the south and national reunification.

Here follows the main issues in the revolution and revolutionary war in the south, describing the peak of the political and military leadership of the Party including First Secretary Le Duan.

Revolution and Revolutionary War is a scientific term which reflected exactly the situation then. It was not only a war but first of all it was a revolution. Therefore, it should not be considered in accordance with the views of a war. It was not a conventional revolution, but a revolutionary war which developed constantly and was selected as a revolutionary method to reach the final target.

Regarding revolution, it included the settlement of a number of issues such as the character of the US imperialists’ ruling regime in the south, the basic contradictions and the main contradictions in the revolution in the south, the tasks and subject of the revolution, and the revolutionary forces and methods of the revolution. Meanwhile, the decision to continue the war featured the political purpose, military task, armed forces, the methods to carry out the war, military art and the rear.

However, the revolution and the revolutionary war have their own law but they support each other. The revolutionary law served as a basis for the mobilisation of the law of the war.

Balance of strength. The revolutionary forces and revolutionary war forces created a double strength. The military forces and revolutionary war forces reflected the operation of the liberation army. The soldiers of the Vietnam People’s Army were much smaller than the US troops as far as their bodily builds are concerned, but they had a better mind as they were backed by a nation of thousand-year history. Mc Namara had to admit that the US lost Vietnam due to the cultural factor. Culture is the most concentrated and sustainable symbol of Vietnam.

Mr Le Duan stressed that the US neo-colonialist regime in the south was weak in their roots and was defeated due to their poor mentality. The US attacked the farmers whom they should have taken advantage of. In fact, the Vietnamese farmers including those in the south had great patriotic and revolutionary spirit. In addition, they were aware of the noble cause  of revolutionary administration which gave them land to till even during the anti-French resistance war.

According to Mr Le Duan’s views, the balance of forces lay within the movement, not in the static position, but the synthesis of both the subjective material conditions and the human objective efforts in the fight between the two sides for the define purpose in the definite space and time. A company of the liberation forces could be able to stand firm in the centre of Saigon was equal to a division in Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands) is an example to cite here.

Mr Le Duan held that in the south, the US was not only weak in the political, but also in the military fields; when its war endeavours reached “the ceiling,” the US had to deescalate and accept the defeat. The US military defeat was unavoidable and the downfall of the US neo-colonialist regime in the south of Vietnam was inevitable.

Methods of revolution, the law of revolution and revolutionary war

In 1967, Mr Le Duan generalised a formula for the revolution and revolutionary war in the south as follows.

1.      Partial uprising was carried out in time and creatively during the revolution in the south. The US imperialists replaced the French colonialists to occupy the south with the aim of building the region into its colony of a new type. So, the Vietnamese people’s uprising was not an excuse for the US to jump in.

2.      The combination of military and politics. This was developed from the uprising to revolutionary war and the combination of military action and political efforts.

3.      Three regions. These included mountainous rural areas, delta rural areas and urban areas and is called in short as rural and urban regions. The important and correct discovery of Mr Le Duan was that he had been successful in defining the way and methods for the revolution in the south not by using the rural areas to surround the urban but combining the attacks against the enemy in both regions.

4.      General assaults and general uprising. This solution was to mobilise all military and political forces and to combine all the forms of struggle of the masses to gain a decisive victory. Mr Le Duan initiated the use of general assaults and general uprising in four periods.

-        During the 1961-1962, he proposed to launch general uprising and general assault to overthrow the US-Diem regime and establish an independent and neutral administration in the south.

-        In 1965, when the “special war” was on the brink of bankruptcy, he suggested to carry out general offensive and general uprising to prevent the enemy from changing to the “local war,” for the purpose of setting up an independent and neutral administration demanding the US to withdraw its troops and expand ties with other countries, yet not with the North.

-        In the 1968 Tet offensive and general uprising was launched. A complete victory was yet to have achieved, but it defeated the US “local war” strategy and smashed the US will for military victory. The US was forced to withdraw its troops and Vietnam won a decisive victory.

-        In 1974, in the “War of Vietnamisation,” there were two choices: to overthrow the Thieu puppet administration to establish a coalition government and then step by step to advance to win a complete victory; or to use the military forces to deal a decisive blow until the final victory. At that time, the fact showed that Vietnam’s forces were much stronger than the enemy and the assault strategy of the revolution and the revolutionary war in the south had really developed into the strategy of military assault of the revolutionary war. And so, general military assault combined with the mass uprising was selected which ended in a complete victory and therefore we avoided the establishment of a coalition government.

Assault strategy. “Concerted uprising” was that the revolution of the south changed from the defensive position for the preservation of forces to the offensive period. That was the assault strategy carried out through uprising and then developed to the revolutionary war, because as Lenin put it, “defence is the fatal path of an uprising.” In the revolutionary war of the south, assault and offensive were the main choice.

Way of fighting. Mr Le Duan described the US war machine in the south as a human body which had crippled legs and hands but still alive. It would die if it suffered a brain haemorrhage or got a sudden death because of cardiac infarction. Therefore, different ways of offensives and assaults should be used by launching attacks on the enemy’s main forces, rear areas, communications and so on in order to destroy its war efforts, and then, the regular forces should launch the decisive campaign to end the war.

The control of the liberation war. The Party Central Committee, Politburo and the Army’s Party Committee had always kept close watch and gave correct leadership and instruction to the battle fields in the south. The best minds of the nation had worked together to issue decisive orders for the liberation and local forces, helping to change the war aspect.

Such talented leadership and creative attacks, especially as Mr Le Duan said, in the “last 15 minutes of the battle” contributed to the rapid and sudden victories, giving the enemy no chance to react. That is how the great victory in Spring 1975 was won.